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Abstract 
In recent years, researchers have increasingly turned their attention to the proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons. Small arms are difficult to track and are not the stuff of military 
parades, but they are immensely destructive. In addition to what is already circulating, a 
substantial percentage of what is newly produced enters the black market and is destined for 
conflict zones across the globe. I argue that the illicit trade in small arms should be understood 
not as a market but as a network, one that shares some important properties with networked 
forms of organization studied by sociologists. I then employ quantitative methods developed for 
the study of social networks in an effort to show the basic structure of illegal small arms transfers 
to Asia, including the Middle East. The analysis draws from my Illicit Arms Transfers (IAT) 
Dataset still in development, so the results make use of the most rudimentary information being 
collected. They are suggestive, however, and the analytical approach promises to shed 
considerable light on a corner of the international arms trade that is of great interest to the 
research and activist communities, and of great consequence to those in war-torn regions of the 
world. 
 
 
 
THE ILLICIT ARMS TRADE IN ASIA: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 
 
Despite the downward trend in the total dollar value of the arms trade since the end of the cold 
war, few believe that there is a similar trend in the international transfer of small arms and light 
weapons (SALW). Comprehensive and reliable longitudinal data on the volume of the SALW 
trade are not available, but developments over the past two decades point to an increase in the 
flow of this type of weaponry. The proliferation of low-intensity warfare, conflicts in which 
SALW figure prominently, is a source of increased demand, while stocks of military surplus 
created by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union vastly 
increased supply.1 Light weaponry continues to be produced—by an expanding number of 
manufacturers, many of them driven to export in order to achieve economies of scale—and some 
of this is added to the second-hand equipment circulating in today’s war zones. 
 Of this trade in SALW, the value of which has been estimated at roughly $4 billion per 
year, probably 10-20 percent occurs in the black and gray markets.2 Information about the illicit 
arms trade abounds, particularly in the form of investigative journalism. Although much of this 
information has been gathered, collated, and examined by researchers in the academic and 
activist communities, systematic data collection and analysis has yet to proceed very far. Data 
collection itself is a formidable task. Aside from the obvious difficulty deriving from the efforts 
of black marketeers to keep their activities out of view, the variety of actors, locales, equipment, 
and forms of transaction involved in the illicit arms trade presents a major challenge for any 
attempt to catalog them in a systematic way. Nevertheless, some progress is being made and 
perhaps it is not too early to begin mapping the structure of black market transfers of SALW.3
 This paper is a preliminary examination of the structure of illicit arms flows into, out of, 
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and within Asia. It is preliminary in two ways. First, I am in the fairly early stages of collecting 
and coding data on illicit arms transfers, an effort that involves scrutinizing news accounts from 
multiple sources. Second, the method of analysis used in this paper, social network analysis 
(SNA), consists of a number of both descriptive and inferential techniques. The techniques most 
appropriate for mapping the small arms trade are the descriptive ones, but it is also the case that 
any mapping using descriptive methods is likely to be sensitive to missing and noisy data. 
Nevertheless, having entered these caveats, I want to give some sense of the main locales 
involved in Asia’s illegal small arms trade, as well as the usefulness of network analytical 
methods for illuminating the structural features of this particular black market. As our 
understanding of this proliferation problem improves, so too will the arms control efforts of 
policymakers and activists. But before moving on to the empirical analysis, I will expand on my 
rationale for treating the small arms trade as a social network. 
 
THE ARMS NETWORK 
Small arms transfers are entail economic transactions, but they are often transactions governed 
by more than market forces. State-sanctioned transfers may be elements in an ongoing military 
relationship between governments and illicit transfers, while driven on the supply side mainly by 
the profit motive, nevertheless require a degree of trust and shared commitment to an 
underground system of economic exchange. To highlight these features, which are common in 
social networks, it is useful to contrast them with straightforward market transactions. 
A market is a social entity that governs transactions between producers and consumers by 
way of a price mechanism, and economists typically locate pure markets at one end of a range of 
possible arrangements for the exchange of goods and services. This is the anarchic end. No 
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authority is exercised in a pure market; economic production is governed by prices, which result 
from individual decisions affecting supply and demand. At the hierarchical end are organized 
social entities like firms. Within a firm, economic production is governed by an entrepreneur, 
whether an individual or a collective, who directs the allocation of resources within the 
organization. One of the questions that has occupied economists is: under what circumstances do 
markets give rise to hierarchical organizations as a means of coordinating economic exchange? 
 The classic treatment of this issue is by Coase, who maintained that “the operation of a 
market costs something and that, by forming an organization and allowing some authority (the 
‘entrepreneur’) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved.”4 In contemporary 
scholarship, these sorts of costs are termed “transaction costs,” and they generally derive from 
the inefficiencies associated with incomplete information.5 Some economic transactions involve 
uncertainties—e.g., about continued access to specialized inputs into the production process—
and although these might be handled by entering into contracts, the continual negotiation and 
renegotiation of contracts is costly. Such transaction costs, at least some of them, can be 
eliminated if the parties enter into an exchange relationship governed according to the bylaws of 
a hierarchical organization. Under these circumstances, firms will realize efficiencies not 
available in the open market and economic production and exchange will become more 
profitable. 
 Patterns of economic exchange governed by more than market forces but by less than 
hierarchical organizations have been of considerable interest to sociologists. Granovetter, for 
instance, has echoed the common criticism of the neoclassical economic approach to 
organization as offering a utilitarian and “undersocialized” conception of human action in which 
little allowance is made for the impact of social relations on economic exchange (except as a 
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drag on the efficient allocation of resources). At the same time, early sociological correctives 
tended to propose “oversocialized” conceptions of behavior whereby individuals simply, and 
somewhat robotically, internalize societal norms, also leaving little room for the impact of 
ongoing social relations.6 For Granovetter and others, economic behavior is governed not only 
by institutional arrangements designed to discourage malfeasance and reduce transaction costs, 
or by a “generalized morality” instilled through the socialization process, but also by trust. 
Economic action is embedded in ongoing social interaction and more emphasis needs to be 
placed on “the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of such relations 
in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance.”7
 A similar gap seems to exist in the political science literature on international 
organization. Liberals have criticized realists for failing to see international institutions as more 
than epiphenomena deriving from the distribution of state power. Instead, taking cues from new 
institutional economics, liberals see them as “information-providing and transaction cost-
reducing entities.”8 Constructivists, in turn, taking cues from the institutionalist approach in 
sociology, fault liberals (and realists) for neglecting “the production and reproduction of 
identities and interests” and for assuming that “how states treat each other in interaction does not 
matter for how they define who they are.”9 But to date the focus of constructivist analysis has 
been on the socialization of states—“states are people too,” Wendt says—and on the emergence 
and reinforcement of norms in international society, rather than on relations between states and 
outcomes that fall short of norm creation and institution building.10
 In departing from transaction-cost explanations, sociologists who study economic 
organization are not abandoning the notion of rational action. They are suggesting that social 
constraints, or “embeddedness,” often makes seemingly nonrational behavior appear quite 
 4
 
 
 
reasonable. Many economic transactions “aim not only at economic goals but also at sociability, 
approval, status, and power.”11 In the realm of world politics, those studying the arms production 
and transfer system have frequently observed that the arms acquisition policies of both 
developed and developing states don’t always make sense in terms of either military or economic 
efficiency. The “rationality” of those procurement patterns becomes apparent only when taking 
into account less material motives like status, prestige, and the symbols of modern statehood.12 
And no less an authority than Hans Morgenthau, realism’s chief exponent, believed that 
“prestige, however exaggerated and absurd its uses may have been at times, is as intrinsic an 
element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the relations between 
individuals.”13
 Inquiry into the role of social relations in the emergence of various forms of economic 
organization is of fairly recent origin in sociology. But much of the research that has been done 
on interpersonal relations in economic life focuses on the creation and maintenance of social 
networks. Less anarchic than markets, networks of economic actors are at the same time not 
hierarchically organized. Where price serves as a control mechanism in markets and authority 
serves that function within a vertically integrated firm, personal relationships, typically 
characterized by trust and a norm of reciprocity, are the glue that binds a social network together. 
It may well be that, under conditions conducive to social networks, hierarchically organized 
social entities are not required as a means of reducing uncertainty and managing transaction 
costs, but from a sociological point of view that begs some important questions. What are those 
conditions? To what extent can they be explained by the social, cultural, and political practices 
that embed economic interaction? Alternatively, to what extent can they be explained by the 
nature of particular forms of economic exchange? 
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 Powell addresses the last of these questions, maintaining that some forms of exchange are 
inherently more social than others. They depend not so much on formal authority, but on shared 
interests and ongoing relationships. In network forms of exchange, “the entangling of obligation 
and reputation reaches a point that the actions of the parties are interdependent.” The pattern of 
interaction “looks more like a marriage than a one-night stand, but there is no marriage license, 
no common household, no pooling of assets.”14 Whereas market transactions are undertaken to 
maximize returns in the short and medium term, network exchanges are sequential and contribute 
to an overall pattern of enduring interaction. Much of what is exchanged in social networks is 
difficult to price—know-how and styles of production, for example—so the flow of information 
through networks is often “richer” than what is transmitted by the price mechanism in markets or 
by controlled channels of communication within a vertically integrated firm. Finally, because the 
mechanism of governance rests largely on trust and obligation, network forms of organization 
function well when composed of homogenous groups of actors. The opportunism and guile 
contributing to high transaction costs in the impersonal market setting is less common among 
those sharing professional, ethnic, or ideological backgrounds, and thus hierarchical governance 
structures are less likely to emerge. 
 
State-sanctioned Arms Transfers 
The arms trade is characterized by some of the same features found in network forms of 
economic organization. Decisions to supply and purchase weaponry are often elements in 
ongoing arms-transfer relationships. In the case of state-sanctioned transfers, they are elements 
of more general military relationships. The supply of finished weapons systems can be 
accompanied by instruction in the operation and maintenance of equipment, construction of 
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support facilities, and other forms of technical assistance. Arms transfers are, in many instances, 
embedded in relationships of mutual defense—e.g., weapons flows between members of formal 
military alliances like NATO—or in less formal commitments by suppliers to the security of 
recipient states. Those more general military relations, whether formal or implied, may also 
involve basing and overflight rights, military training and joint exercises, the coordination of 
strategy and tactics, the sharing of military intelligence, and other forms of collaboration 
intended to enhance the security of both parties to the transaction. While particular arms-transfer 
agreements may take the form of arms-length contracts, much of their meaning is lost if they are 
extracted from this social context. Instead of contracts, they may actually resemble long-term 
investments in mutually beneficial interstate relationships. 
 Consistent with Powell’s description of exchanges within networks, it is difficult to 
attach a value to the political and military commitments that often accompany arms transfers 
between states. In addition to interstate commitments, weapons supplies embody the transfer of 
military technology, and many deals include arrangements for the licensed production of military 
equipment by the recipient. This flow of technology and know-how between states, which is also 
hard to price, is an important feature of the contemporary arms trade and has had a measurable 
impact on the emergence of a “third tier” of arms producers in the international system.15 Thus, 
the information and meaning embodied in arms transfers can be substantially richer than what 
might be indicated by the market or military-use value of the weapons themselves. 
 Much more is involved in these transactions than a shipment of some increment of 
destructive capability from one to another state. Because arms transfers are indicative of the 
supplier’s commitment to the recipient’s security, as well as the recipient’s expectation (perhaps 
backed up with certain concessions) that it can count on this commitment into the future, the 
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most significant and enduring arms-transfer relationships link states with congruent foreign 
policy orientations. During the cold war, for instance, the United States and its allies tended to 
supply arms to states whose policies were generally in accord with the global political-economic 
status quo, while the Soviet Union and its allies tended to supply dissatisfied or revisionist 
states.16 There was, then, in the arms-transfer network a certain homogeneity among states with 
the closest and most dependable ties. Such shared foreign policy orientations are not unlike the 
shared backgrounds (professional, ethnic, religious) that help sustain social networks comprised 
of individuals. 
 
Black Market Transfers 
Of course, not all arms transfers between states are imbued with social meaning; nor are transfers 
between nonstate actors. Indeed, illicit arms transfers by private dealers are typically undertaken 
solely for reasons of economic gain, so it might seem that the market conceptualization ought to 
work well in this realm of the global arms trade. Yet illegal weaponry clearly does flow through 
transnational networks, as do narcotics and other contraband; on its face, “networkness” seems to 
be a more obvious feature of the black market arms trade than does its “marketness.” 
 When comparing market and network forms of organization—and one could imagine 
hybrid forms as well—it is probably useful to distinguish between the nature of the goods being 
exchanged and the mode of exchange.17 Above I suggested that states sometimes transfer arms, 
or sanction the transfer of arms, for reasons other than economic gain; arms transfers embody 
security commitments as well as raw military capability. Analogous commitments usually do not 
attach to black market transfers, at least those involving private dealers and their brokers. But 
other types of commitments are involved that lend these transactions to network forms of 
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organization. Specifically, because these arms transfers are illegal and must be kept out of view, 
the transactions that enable them—deal-making, document forgery, financial transfers, illicit 
transport, and so on—also must be kept out of view, and parties to the transaction must trust each 
other in this regard. Furthermore, in many cases, the parties to such transactions anticipate the 
need for future exchanges, and therefore would like to be able to return to, or reactivate, these 
transfer channels as those needs arise. Their options are kept open by a set of mutual 
understandings and commitments to the maintenance of the social network.18
 I am suggesting that, in the black market, transferred weaponry is not itself indicative of 
shared interests—say, common political or ideological goals that are furthered by the recipient’s 
enhanced military capability. Yet the parties’ separate interests—economic, military, or 
otherwise—surely are served by the maintenance of the black market’s infrastructure. Political, 
ideological, or other religious and ethnic attachments, may be relevant in a different way, 
however. Because black market arms transfers occur in a lawless environment, one without 
formal mechanisms of contract enforcement, parties to these transactions must rely more heavily 
on trust (often reinforced by threat) than is the case for legal market transactions. This is why 
many criminal organizations recruit members close to home. The social cohesion created by 
ethnic, religious, or ideological bonds reduces the likelihood of defection and thus the risks of 
operating in an extralegal environment. Economic theories of rebellion posit similar social 
dynamics.19
 More theoretical work needs to be done in order to fully conceptualize the global arms 
trade, and its multiple legal and illegal forms, as a social network. While it may be somewhat 
premature to proceed with empirical analysis, I believe that the network characteristics of the 
arms trade, and especially the black market trade, are sufficiently compelling that it is 
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appropriate to simultaneously explore its structural features using some of the quantitative 
methods developed for social network analysis.  
 
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
The focus of social network analysis (SNA) is less on the attributes or behavior of actors than on 
the structural dimensions of their social environment, which are distilled from the overall pattern 
of relationships or exchanges among the actors. The social network itself is defined as the group 
of actors and the relationships or interactions that link them, and SNA methods are applied once 
it is assumed (or demonstrated) that a group of actors constitutes a network. That is, SNA is not a 
means of distinguishing networks from other forms of social organization, like anarchical or 
hierarchical forms, nor does it provide a way to assess the degree of “networkness” 
characterizing a given social grouping. The premise of SNA is that the organization of a set of 
interrelated actors bears some resemblance to a social network and that it is therefore useful to 
examine its structural dimensions.20
 
The Illicit Arms Transfers Dataset 
The Illicit Arms Transfers (IAT) Dataset is an evolving datafile consisting of information 
gleaned from news reports of illegal arms shipments crossing interstate borders.21 The goal is to 
systematize the large amount of information that exists about the international black market in 
armaments (mostly small arms and light weapons) so that some of these data might be subjected 
to rigorous analysis, with special emphasis on the structures and vulnerabilities of the 
underground networks. The data collection effort involves scrutinizing written accounts of illegal 
arms shipments and extracting information according to established coding rules. Presently, the 
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main source of raw data are the Black Market File Archives maintained by the Norwegian 
Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT).22
 The unit of observation in the IAT Dataset is the arms transfer event—that is, a shipment 
of weapons from an originator to a recipient, possibly intercepted along the way. Each record in 
the database consists of data describing that event, including the actors and locations involved in 
the shipment’s journey from originator to recipient (or interceptor), as well as the information 
source. Each variable is a descriptor and these event descriptors are grouped as they pertain to (a) 
the source of the arms shipment, (b) those involved in the arms deal, (c) the characteristics of 
the arms shipped, (d) the journey that the shipment took after leaving the source, and (e) the 
shipment’s destination.  
 The reports in NISAT’s archives vary widely in the amount of useful information 
contained therein. Some include detailed accounts of arms shipments from manufacturer to 
purchaser, and any number of participating intermediate dealers, brokers, and shipping agents. 
Other reports include no codable information at all. Some reports provide a wealth of 
background information, like previous events in an ongoing arms-supply relationship. Others 
pick up a particular shipment’s journey midstream, as when one military organization supplies 
another organization, without any indication of where the first group acquired the weaponry. 
Even when reports contain relatively complete information, the events themselves exhibit a wide 
range of forms. There is substantial variation in the number and type of intermediaries engaged 
in the transfers, the nature of the illegalities involved (forged end-user certificates, arsenal theft, 
etc.), and whether the transfers were intercepted by state authorities or someone else other than 
the intended recipient. 
 The informational requirements for the present analysis are minimal, however. Networks 
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consist of nodes and links (or, in the language of graph theory, “vertices” and “edges”). I 
examine the illegal arms network operating in Asia, and the nodes in this network are 
operationalized as the state locales from which, to which, or through which illicit weapons 
shipments have moved. Eventually, the IAT Dataset will allow me to operationalize network 
nodes as actors involved in these transactions, with locale simply being one of their attributes, 
but a more refined analysis must await further database development. State locales are nodes in 
the network examined here if they were involved in at least one illegal arms transfer during the 
1995–2005 period, the time span for which I have coded data, and if there was sufficient 
information to identify the state locale at both ends of the transfer. No other information from the 
database is used here. The network consists of 67 nodes—37 Asian states (9 of them in the 
Middle East) and 30 non-Asian states—with 124 links among them.  
 
Network Structure 
Barabási and his associates have observed the ubiquity of networks in physical, biological, and 
social systems, and they point out that many of these networks have “scale-free” structures.23 In 
contrast to random networks, in which links or social ties are distributed randomly across the 
nodes, scale-free networks consist of some nodes with large numbers of connections (network 
hubs), and many others with very few connections. For example, Barabási and associates have 
found that links to pages on the World Wide Web have a “power law” distribution: 
  (1) γ−≈ kkP )(
where P(k) is the probability of a network node with k links; k is the number of links per node; 
and the exponent −γ is a constant. One implication is that scale-free networks are resilient to 
random failures of their nodes and links; the existence of well-connected hubs sustains the 
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network’s connectivity by providing paths between many pairs of nodes. On the other hand, 
targeted attacks on one or more hubs may bring about catastrophic network failure. 
 Figure 1 depicts the illicit arms market operating in Asia, including the Middle East. Of 
course, the illicit arms trade is not regionally self contained, so other regions are also shown to 
the extent that state locales are connected in some way to weaponry flowing into or out of Asia.  
On the face of it, this does not appear to be a random network. Some state locales are much more 
connected in the black market trade than are others: Israel (ISR) and Iran (IRN) especially, but 
also , Kenya (KEN), Democratic Republic of Congo (ZAR), Uganda (UGA), and Sudan (SDN), 
for example, but also India (IND), Pakistan (PAK), and China (CHN), as well as some non-
Asian locales like Turkey (TUR), Russia (RUS), Czechoslovakia (CZR), and the United States 
(USA). The latter are primarily supplier locales, of course, while the former are recipient locales. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of k-linked state locales. The probability of being linked 
to k other network nodes diminishes rapidly as k increases, and this is true for the distribution of 
arms inflow and outflow locales. The estimated exponents for the distributions shown in Figure 2 
are lower than those typically reported for scale-free networks like the World Wide Web, sexual 
partners, or communities of collaborating scholars, which the literature suggests ranges between 
2.0 and 3.0. Barabási and Albert show that such networks emerge when there is a constant 
addition of new nodes over time (dynamic growth) and when these new nodes link to older nodes 
with higher probability than they link with newer nodes (preferential attachment).24 One possible 
explanation for the smaller exponents I am obtaining is that they are an artifact of having 
operationalized network nodes as state locales rather the actual actors involved in the 
transactions. The addition of state locales to the illicit arms network is limited by the number of 
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independent states, whereas the addition of actors is not. Again, this possibility can be explored 
further as the IAT database evolves. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Central Locales 
An arms transfer is a directed link in that it represents the flow of military resources from one 
state locale (or actor) to another. The network data are arranged as a square “sociomatrix” in 
which there is both a row and a column for each node in the network. A cell in the matrix 
contains a 1 if an actor located in the state represented by row i, designated ni, transferred arms 
to an actor in the state represented by column j, designated nj, in which case xij = 1 ; otherwise xij 
= 0. The main diagonal of the sociomatrix, where i = j, is ignored.25 The outdegree of node i, 
d(ni), is the number of other state locales to which arms from ni have been shipped; indegree, 
d(nj), is the total number of state locales from which arms to nj have been shipped. That is, 
 ∑
≠∀
=
ji
iji xnd )(   and  ∑
≠∀
=
ij
jij xnd )( , (2)  
which are, respectively, the row i and column j totals of the sociomatrix. If there are s state 
locales in the network, the maximum number of directed ties between them is s(s − 1). 
In most social networks, certain actors are more prominent than others and the evidence 
of their prominence is often the number and type of social ties they maintain with other actors. 
The centrality of a network actor is sometimes indexed as its outdegree or indegree (or both), but 
since these measures are greatly affected by the number of actors in a network, it is useful to 
normalize the index. Thus, the normalized outdegree and indegree centrality indexes for state 
locales in the illegal arms trade can be computed as 
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Although this index will identify the most connected locales, it does so by counting only direct 
links between nodes. 
In the black arms market, where goods often reach their destinations through circuitous 
routes, central locales are also those that provide indirect conduits between suppliers and 
recipients. An alternative measure of centrality, closeness centrality, uses geodesic distances 
between nodes, which may be indirect paths with two or more legs. In a network comprised of 
directional links, like this one, the geodesic distance from node i to node j, d(ni,nj), is not 
necessarily the same as the distance from j to i, d(nj,ni). Central locales, defined in terms of 
closeness, are those that are connected to many others through short distance paths. Closeness 
centrality is computed as the inverse of the summed geodesic distances between node i and all 
other nodes. A given node is maximally close to all others when it has direct links to all (s − 1) 
of them, so the index can be normalized by using this distance in the numerator. That is, 
 ∑
≠∀
−=′
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 Figures 3 and 4 arrange the state locales in the illicit arms trade so that the most central 
locales, in terms of closeness, are positioned nearer the center of ten concentric rings, while less 
central locales are positioned nearer the periphery. (Middle East countries appear as red circles, 
other Asian countries as red triangles, and non-Asian countries as blue squares.) Figure 3 is 
constructed using inwardly directed geodesic distances (“in-closeness”). Iran, India, and Pakistan 
have the highest in-closeness scores, followed by Israel, Sri Lanka (LKA), Myanmar (MMR), 
and Turkey, then by Afghanistan (AFG), Indonesia (IDA), Palestine (PLO), Cambodia (KHM), 
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China, Taiwan (TAW), and the United States. They have the most direct and shortest indirect 
links to supplying locales. This is surely explained, in part, by high demand, as many have 
experienced sustained internal warfare during the period examined here. Related to this, perhaps 
as both cause and effect, is the existence of an underground infrastructure that makes getting 
weapons to these locales possible (even easy)—and of course profitable. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 Because I have selected out of the IAT Dataset only those arms transfer events involving 
Asian locales, it is to be expected that the most closely connected locales, in terms of arms 
inflows, are located in Asia where demand is higher. The most closely connected non-Asian 
states are better revealed by examining outwardly directed geodesic distances (“out-closeness”), 
as these states are more likely to be involved as supply locales. Figure 4 shows this, but also 
shows that some Asian (including Middle Eastern) states are closely linked to other recipient 
locales. Israel has the highest out-closeness score, followed by Afghanistan, Iran, 
Czechoslovakia, and the United States. Note as well the location of former Soviet bloc states 
closer to the center than to periphery of the chart: Czechoslovakia, Russia, Poland (POL), 
Croatia (HRV), Yugoslavia/Serbia (YUG), Croatia (HRV), Belarus (BLR), Hungary (HUN), and 
Bulgaria (BLG). 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Pivotal Locales 
Nodes in a network may also be important to the extent that they are positioned between two 
other nodes. In the case of the illicit arms trade, when one locale, ni, has links to two other 
locales, nj and nk, which are not linked directly, ni may provide an important conduit for arms 
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shipments between actors in nj and nk. Some of the most important conduits are likely to be those 
lying on the geodesic paths connecting nj and nk. Thus, another measure of centrality, 
betweenness centrality, starts with the number of geodesics, gjk, linking nodes j and k, and the 
number of these that contain node i, gjk(ni). Betweenness can be measured as the sum of the 
probabilities that node i will be pivotal in transactions between j and k:26
 ∑
≠≠<∀
=
kijkj jk
ijk
B g
ng
C
,
)(
. (5) 
This measure is at its maximum when node i is located on all geodesics in the network. Not 
including node i, there are (s − 1)(s − 2) possible directional links, and half that number of 
possible nondirectional links. CB can therefore be normalized as: B
 
1
2
)2)(1( −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=′ ssCC BB . (6) 
 For purposes of computing betweenness centrality scores, I include state locales serving 
as transshipment points, so the network is somewhat larger than that analyzed thus far: 73 nodes 
with 167 links between them. Figure 5 identifies the state locales with the highest scores: Iran 
and Israel, followed by Pakistan, Russia, China, and Afghanistan. The literature on social and 
physical networks has long recognized the importance of such pivotal nodes in mediating the 
interactions between nonadjacent nodes.27 Nodes characterized by high levels of betweenness 
are also the network’s “high stress” points. Indeed, computing betweenness scores would seem 
to be the best way to identify the network’s hubs and, for those wishing to disrupt the network, 
the best way to identify targets for concentrated attack. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 Closely related to this concept of betweenness is “brokerage.” Brokers are nodes 
positioned between nonadjacent actors and through which a directional interaction takes place. 
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Nodes that function as brokers for many node pairs therefore have high betweenness scores. 
Social network analysts have gone on to specify particular brokerage roles based on the actors’ 
membership in groups.28 For instance, a node occupies a “coordinator” role when it is interposed 
between nodes within its same group or organization. When the three nodes are members of 
different groups, the broker acts as a “liaison.” Figure 6 depicts the brokerage roles operating 
when the broker and one actor are members of one group and the other actor is a member of a 
second group. Brokers (B) that mediate outflows from their own group are “representatives”; 
those that mediate inflows into their group are “gatekeepers.” 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 Identifying important brokers in a social network involves counting the number of triads 
in which the node is positioned as an intermediary. In the illicit arms trade, there are individuals 
and organizations that serve as brokers for particular arms transactions, and the IAT Dataset 
records these actors and their roles when the information is available. Because this analysis is 
limited to state locales, however, to say that locale B served as a broker for transfers between A 
and C simply means that arms were shipped from A to B and arms—not necessarily the same 
ones—were shipped from B to C; but arms were not shipped from A to C. That is, locale B is a 
broker to the extent that B could possibly function as a conduit for the shipment of illegal 
weapons from A to C, based on observed arms trade patterns from 1995 to 2005. 
 I divide state locales into three groups—Asian countries, Middle Eastern countries, and 
other countries—although potentially more interesting groupings would be possible for this sort 
of analysis (based on political and economic characteristics, and not simply geographic ones). If 
node j is a broker for i and k, then let bj(ik) = 1; otherwise bj(ik) = 0. Node j’s brokerage score for 
the network is: 
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The score can be calculated conditional on the direction of the transaction flow and i’s, j’s, and 
k’s group membership, so that brokerage scores correspond to j’s role as a coordinator, 
representative, gatekeeper, etc. 
 Table 1 reports the scores for the top broker locales in Asia’s illegal arms trade. It is no 
surprise that the leading gatekeepers are Asian and Middle Eastern countries; they are 
destinations for weapons shipped from outside the region and departure points for arms shipped 
to other locales within the region. Iran tops the list, which conforms to its position as the most 
central locale measured in terms closeness and betweenness. Thailand is also a leading 
gatekeeper, and along with China a leader coordinator locale—a destination and departure point 
for arms shipped among Asian countries. Israel is the most prominent broker locale in regard to 
the shipment of illegal arms out of the Middle East. Other locales positioned as representative-
type brokers are considerably less connected than Israel. Russia is the only non-Asian country 
among these top brokers; it is a destination for arms shipped from other non-Asian countries and 
a departure point for shipments into Asia and the Middle East. Again, I want to emphasize that 
the data used here only allow me to identify as brokers those nodes interposed between supplier 
and recipient locales. Determining the extent to which these nodes serve as conduits for weapons 
cargo transferred between nonadjacent nodes requires shipment-level data that I am still in the 
process of collecting. 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Structural Equivalence 
A different kind of mapping can shed light on the structural positions of illicit arms-supply and 
arms-recipient locales. A “position” in a social network is understood as a particular set of 
relations with particular groupings of actors. Two or more actors who occupy similar positions in 
the network structure have similar relations with those groupings. Two or more actors are 
structurally equivalent if they have exactly the same ties to all other actors in the network. 
Rarely are actors structurally equivalent, except in trivial ways, so the task for SNA is to 
determine how close actors’ positions are to one another. 
 The Euclidean distance between actors i and j, dij, is measured based on the presence or 
absence of relations with all other actors in the network. This distance can be computed with 
respect to either directed or undirected ties, but my interest here is directed ties—i.e., arms 
shipments from i and j to the (g − 2) other locales, as well as arms shipments to i and j. 
Therefore, 
∑
=
−=
g
k
jkikij xxd
1
2)(  
for i ≠ k and j ≠ k. This is simply the total difference between row i and row j of the sociomatrix. 
For structurally equivalent actors, dij = 0, and for all other pairs, dij > 0. The maximum Euclidean 
distance between a pair of actors, occurring when the pair has different ties to all (g − 2) other 
actors, is )2(2 −g . The pairwise distances between arms suppliers is used to construct a 
symmetric g × g matrix, D = {dij}, and this new distance matrix becomes the raw data for a map 
of the arms trade network in two-dimensional space. For purposes of visualization, the distances 
between the actors on this map should correspond as closely as possible to the Euclidean 
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distances in D, and to that end multidimensional scaling (MDS) can be employed to obtain each 
actor’s coordinates in two dimensions from the distance matrix. 
 Figure 6 maps the positions of state locales in Asia’s illicit arms trade. Each state’s 
position is determined by essentially two discrete bits of information: the number of links to 
other state locales (whether as a supplier or a recipient) and the identity of those other states. The 
clump of countries very close to the origin are those with few arms-transfer ties to the other 
states.  For states farther from the origin, exact position is determine also by the identity of the 
other states with which they are linked. Israel is structurally distinct from other state locales by 
virtue its large number of links to a broad cross-section of other states. Most of the states in the 
southeast quadrant are located in the Middle East as well and cluster together because their links 
are with a similar set of other states (including among themselves). Most of the states in the 
southwest quadrant are located in South and Southeast Asia and cluster together for analogous 
reasons. This structural map suggests the importance of geographical proximity in affecting the 
decisions of arms suppliers and purchasers, and the various intermediaries that facilitate the 
deals, something we would expect in the illicit arms trade. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The illicit arms trade shares some important properties with networked forms of organization 
studied by sociologists. The complex and convoluted nature of black market arms transfers suits 
this realm of the arms trade especially well to investigation as a social network. Like any 
underground activity involving the exchange and transport of contraband (drugs, counterfeit 
currency, humans), the illicit arms trade operates within an informal organizational environment. 
The forces of supply and demand are mediated by the forces of trust, loyalty, and mutual 
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commitment that govern the flow of information and material within a social network.29
 Since my dataset on the illicit arms trade are still at an early stage of development, the 
analysis in this paper employs only descriptive methods designed to explore the main structural 
features of social networks. The results are not definitive, but they are suggestive. Asia’s black 
arms market is structured as a scale-free network, even when the network nodes are 
operationalized fairly crudely as state locales. The locales occupying central position in the 
network readily stand out. Israel and Iran have especially high profiles; they are directly linked to 
many other locales and are positioned as potentially pivotal nodes for arms transfers following 
indirect routes. Among the countries where arms suppliers and transporters are located, former 
members of the Soviet bloc stand out. One explanation for their prominence in Africa’s illicit 
arms trade might be found in the availability of cold war surplus and a black market 
infrastructure nurtured originally by their communist economic systems. This, at least, is a 
reasonable working hypothesis for subsequent empirical research. 
 The utility of SNA methods (or any other quantitative methods) for illuminating the illicit 
arms trade obviously hinges on the quality of data that can be collected. Mapping the structure of 
the black market is hampered by the secrecy with which deals are concluded and the shadiness of 
the actors involved. What we do know about it is due mainly to the perseverance of enterprising 
activists and investigative reporters and, as with any data source, this information is subject to 
measurement error and selection bias. The analysis of network dynamics often requires fairly 
complete information about nodes and links, particularly if the aim is to model network 
vulnerabilities. If the lack of information makes it necessary to restrict analysis to sampled data, 
important elements of the network structure may be missed. However, this danger should be less 
pronounced when examining scale-free networks because even incomplete information is likely 
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to identify the most prominent nodes. That is, the same feature that makes these networks robust 
in the face of random failure also makes them more visible in the face of systematic efforts to 
reveal them. If I am right that the illicit arms trade is a scale-free network, then the fact that some 
of it remains hidden from view need not prevent us from mapping its basic structure. 
 More sophisticated SNA methods will become useful as our data collections improve. 
Rather than simply identifying actors and locales in the illicit arms trade, it will become possible 
to model the linkages among them as a function of factors on both the supply and demand side. 
The role of ongoing conflict, social and economic deprivation, weapons surpluses, criminal 
networks, and other conditions conducive to proliferation have been highlighted by small arms 
researchers and activists, including contributors to this symposium. The cause of arms control 
will be advanced to the extent that we can identify the most important forces driving 
proliferation, especially those that are most subject to policy intervention and manipulation, and 
the actors and locales that figure prominently as hubs in the arms supply network. When 
resources are scarce and attentions divided, efforts must be focused where they will do the most 
good. 
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Table 1: Leading Broker Locales in the Asia’s Illicit Arms Trade 
Broker Locale Gatekeeper Coordinator  Broker Locale Representative
Iran  51  5   Israel  101 
Thailand  21  38   China  12 
Pakistan  19  5   Russia  12 
Syria  14  1   Jordan  6 
China  13  29   Iran  3 
* Not among the top ten coordinator locales. 
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Figure 1: Locales in Asia’s Illicit Arms Trade
Europe
South
America
Middle
East
Asia
North
America
Africa
k
k
k
P(k)
A
ll 
Li
nk
s
In
flo
w
 L
in
ks
O
ut
flo
w
 L
in
ks
γ O
I =
 1
.1
2
R
2 
= 
0.
78
γ I
 =
 1
.3
4
R
2 
= 
0.
91
γ O
 =
 1
.2
5
R
2 
= 
0.
91
Fi
gu
re
 2
: D
is
tri
bu
tio
n 
of
 L
in
ke
d 
St
at
e 
Lo
ca
le
s A
si
a’
s I
lli
ci
t A
rm
s T
ra
de
Figure 3: Inflow Centrality in Asia’s Illicit Arms Trade
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Figure 6: Structural Difference in Asia’s Illicit Arms Trade
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